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About 50 police officers from several Delaware County townships joined Pennsylvania State Police troopers to operate a DUI checkpoint one weekend in June. Officers stopped an estimated 2,500 motorists to check for sobriety. The stops were not based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Anyone driving through that intersection was subject to being stopped and questioned. This raises a seemingly obvious question of how this is legal under the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled over 20 years ago that “sobriety checkpoints” like the one in Upper Darby do not violate the Fourth Amendment. It left it to the states to decide whether to restrict police authority in this regard. A few states have chosen to do so, but not Pennsylvania.

Police established the checkpoint at a busy intersection in Upper Darby Township. They began stopping vehicles at 10:00 p.m. on Friday, June 6, 2014 and continued until 2:00 a.m. Sunday morning. They allowed at least 500 vehicles to pass without inspection when lines of cars backed up almost two blocks. Police say they administered field sobriety tests to about 25 people, resulting in DUI charges against 13 people. They issued citations for other traffic violations as well, such as expired inspection or registration, unrestrained children, and license suspensions.

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The Pennsylvania General Assembly passed a bill in June 2014 that increases the minimum penalties for certain vehicular homicide convictions. The bill provides for an increased minimum prison sentence and permanent license suspension for the offense of “homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence.” It would apply to defendants with previous convictions for any DUI offense, not just felony DUI, or for other serious traffic offenses. The bill’s sponsor cites the danger of repeat offenders, but the bill casts a very wide net, applying to anyone with a prior DUI offense at any level.

Representative Dan Moul (R-Adams/Franklin) introduced House Bill 1733 in October 2013. He nicknamed the bill “Angie’s Law,” after a woman who was reportedly killed in an automobile accident in September 2012. The other driver had an arrest for DUI from the previous year and had reportedly entered a rehabilitation program prior to the accident. He pleaded guilty to homicide by vehicle while DUI, and the court sentenced him to three and a half years in prison.

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A new law passed by the Pennsylvania Legislature and signed by the Governor closes a loophole in Pennsylvania law, according to the bill’s supporters, that encouraged people who were driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (DUI) to flee the scene of an accident in certain situations. Supporters of the bill argued that drunk drivers had an incentive to flee the scene in order to avoid a DUI charge. The new law, which will take effect on or about August 29, 2014, increases the minimum penalty for fleeing the scene of a fatal automobile accident, thereby removing any incentive to flee and closing the loophole.

Pennsylvania law requires any person involved in an accident that causes injury or death to stop immediately and remain at the scene of the accident. The driver must provide his or her name, address, and vehicle registration number to any other driver involved in the accident. Upon request, the driver must show his or her driver’s license and proof of insurance. Under current law, the penalty for failing to stop after an accident, commonly known as “fleeing the scene,” which has resulted in a person’s death is a minimum sentence of one year in prison and a minimum fine of $2,500. Minimum sentences and fines for DUI convictions are often much lower than this.

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People who operate vehicles in Pennsylvania have consented to chemical testing, simply by virtue of operating a vehicle, if they are suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), according to Pennsylvania law. This applies even if a person is operating a bicycle at the time police seek to perform a chemical test, according to a recent ruling by the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court in Bilka v. Commonwealth. The defendant appealed an 18-month license suspension ordered after he refused to submit to blood testing. He argued that the implied consent law did not apply to him because he was riding a bicycle, which does not require a license, at the time of his arrest. The trial court and Commonwealth Court disagreed and affirmed the license suspension.

A police officer stopped the defendant, who was on a bicycle, shortly before midnight on September 15, 2011. The officer alleged that he observed the defendant run a red light, and that the bicycle lacked the headlight and side reflectors required by law. He claimed that the defendant smelled of alcohol, had slurred speech, and had trouble walking when he got off the bicycle. After the defendant refused to perform field sobriety testing, the officer placed him under arrest. The defendant refused to submit to blood testing, reportedly telling the officer that he could not be arrested for DUI on a bicycle.

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An appeal in the Pennsylvania Superior Court claimed that a field sobriety test conducted on a snow-covered road, along with breath testing conducted without the 20-minute observation period required by Pennsylvania law, were insufficient to support a conviction for driving under the influence (DUI). The defendant/appellant in Commonwealth v. Favinger challenged the sufficiency of the evidence against him and the legality of the traffic stop that led to his arrest. The Superior Court ultimately affirmed the verdict and sentence, but its opinion offers a useful overview of the different ways that prosecutors may establish that a defendant was impaired by alcohol in a DUI case.

A state trooper pulled the defendant over at about 3:20 a.m. on January 29, 2011. The trooper testified that the defendant continued to travel about half a mile after the trooper activated his emergency lights, finally stopping in a driveway. He claimed that he detected the odor of alcohol, and that the defendant’s eyes were “bloodshot and glassy.” The defendant agreed to field sobriety testing, which the trooper claimed he failed. Breath testing conducted after the defendant’s arrest showed blood alcohol content (BAC) of 0.128 percent. The defendant was later convicted of DUI–general impairment and DUI–high rate of alcohol.

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A DUI defendant appealed her conviction of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), highest rate of alcohol, to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, claiming that the charge filed against her was defective. Pennsylvania law and the U.S. Constitution require prosecutors to provide specific information to defendants, including the date of the alleged offense, to allow them to prepare a defense. The defendant claimed that the information charging her with DUI stated the date of the offense incorrectly and that she therefore lacked adequate notice of the charge against her. The Superior Court, ruling in Commonwealth v. McKee, denied the appeal. It held that prosecutors supplemented the information prior to trial and that the error did not prejudice the defendant’s case.

The defendant did not dispute the facts that directly resulted in her DUI conviction. Police stopped her vehicle at about 11:40 p.m. on November 21, 2011, placed her under arrest, and transported her to a State Police barracks. A trooper administered a breath test at about 12:15 a.m., which reportedly showed blood alcohol content (BAC) greater than 0.16 percent. Prosecutors filed an information charging her with DUI at the highest rate of alcohol in March 2012. The information stated that the offense occurred on November 22, 2011, not November 21.

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A Pennsylvania man appealed his conviction of driving under the influence (DUI)—incapable of safely driving and DUI—highest rate of alcohol, arguing that the arresting officers lacked reasonable suspicion of a crime when they stopped his car, and that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled, in Commonwealth v. Landis, that the defendant was entitled to a new trial on the “weight of the evidence” argument. It held that the trial court abused its discretion by incorrectly applying the law.

Pennsylvania State Troopers pulled the defendant over on State Route 35 at 2:40 a.m. on April 4, 2010, after allegedly witnessing his vehicle weave within its lane and cross the center double-yellow line several times. The defendant admitted to having several drinks. The troopers arrested him and took him to a nearby hospital, where a medical technician drew blood and conducted a single chemical test using an Avid Axsym machine. The test showed blood alcohol content (BAC) of 0.164 percent.

At trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress for lack of reasonable suspicion, which the trial court denied. He challenged the reliability of the Avid Axsym machine. The medical technician testified that the machine had a ten percent margin of error, which was not considered in its BAC report. The defendant argued that the Avid Axsym machine was less reliable than a gas chromatography test, and that his BAC result based on a single test was unreliable. A jury found him guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to a prison sentence of ninety days to five years less one day. Continue reading

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The question of whether an appellate court could reverse a DUI conviction based on its own interpretation of the evidence recently came before the Indiana Supreme Court, demonstrating the critical importance of challenging police testimony as early as possible. The defendant argued that video footage from a sheriff’s deputy’s vehicle camera contradicted the deputy’s testimony, making the traffic stop unconstitutional and requiring the court to dismiss the case. The trial court disagreed, but the appellate court found the video evidence compelling. The state supreme court affirmed the verdict ruled in Robinson v. Indiana, ruling that it should defer to the trial court’s findings of fact in the absence of a significant constitutional concern.

A sheriff’s deputy testified that he pulled the defendant over after observing her vehicle veer off the right side of the road twice at about 1:00 a.m. on October 15, 2011. A video camera in the deputy’s car recorded the stop. The defendant reportedly failed three field sobriety tests, and she admitted to drinking one beer and to having marijuana on her person. A chemical test at the jail showed blood alcohol content of 0.09 percent, just above the legal limit. Prosecutors charged her with DUI and several other offenses.

The defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the traffic stop and to dismiss the case. Two U.S. Supreme Court cases, 1968’s Terry v. Ohio and 1996’s Ornelas v. United States, have established that the Fourth Amendment requires “reasonable suspicion” of a crime in order to stop someone’s vehicle. The defendant alleged that the video footage from the deputy’s car showed that her vehicle never veered off the road like the deputy claimed, and that he therefore never had reasonable suspicion. Continue reading

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A Pennsylvania judge ruled in February that prosecutors had produced sufficient evidence to support two counts of aggravated assault by vehicle while driving under the influence, which arose from a single-car accident in October 2010. The defendant had moved to dismiss the aggravated assault charges, claiming that the injuries did not rise to the level of “serious bodily injury” as required by Pennsylvania law. The aggravated assault by vehicle statute presents another interesting issue for prosecutors, as it states that a defendant must have acted “negligently.” The question of whether negligence, or criminal negligence, is an essential element of this offense remains unsettled by Pennsylvania courts.

According to the Pittsburgh Tribune, the defendant, who was a college sophomore at the time, was driving with two passengers in his car on October 15, 2010. He was traveling at about sixty-five miles per hour, according to police, when the car struck a tree. Court records state that one passenger suffered multiple injuries, including a broken leg; while the other passenger suffered a fractured spine and head injuries. Police claim that the defendant had blood alcohol content of 0.178 percent.

Prosecutors charged the defendant with driving under the influence – general impairment, as well as first-offense driving under the influence as a minor. They also filed two charges of aggravated assault by vehicle while driving under the influence, as well as reckless driving, unsafe speed, purchase of an alcoholic beverage by a minor, and operating a motor vehicle as a minor with alcohol in their system. The defendant moved to dismiss the aggravated assault charges, claiming that the injuries did not present “substantial risk of death,” “permanent disfigurement,” or extended loss of use of a limb or organ, as required by statute. The court disagreed. Continue reading

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The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania recently considered the appeal of a license suspension for refusal to submit to chemical testing. The defendant in Commonwealth v. Campbell denied that she refused testing, and the record shows that she consented to breath testing and submitted several samples. Rather, she argued that the police did not give her enough opportunity to comply with the testing requirement. The court reviewed the elements that the state must prove in order to prove refusal. It affirmed the trial court’s order, meaning that a driver who agrees to submit to chemical testing could still be charged with refusal.

Police arrested the defendant shortly before midnight on February 12, 2012. The arresting officer administered a portable breath test, which reportedly showed blood alcohol content (BAC) of .18 percent. He concluded that the defendant had been driving under the influence of alcohol, placed her under arrest, and took her to a sheriff’s office with a chemical testing facility.

At the sheriff’s office, a deputy sheriff reportedly read the Implied Consent Law warnings to the defendant “several times,” and the defendant stated that she understood the warnings and agreed to submit to chemical testing. The deputy testified in court that he used a “BAC Data Master” for breath testing. The deputy testified that the defendant failed to perform the test properly, despite his instructions. She allegedly only breathed into the mouthpiece for four to five seconds, which was not enough time to collect a sample. The deputy allowed her to try again, but claimed that the second sample was also insufficient. His supervisor prevented him from giving her a third try. Continue reading